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INTERFACES
STRAW MEN AND OLD SAWS –  
AN EVIDENCE-BASED RESPONSE  
TO SY & TINKER’S CRITIQUE  
OF ACCOUNTING HISTORY
Thomas N. Tyson




Abstract: In a recent Accounting History article, Sy and Tinker (S&T) 
[2005] critique accounting history for its support of “archivalism” 
and empiricism in light of irrefutable arguments against these “an-
tiquarian epistemes.” While tempted to lambaste S&T’s article as un-
fettered social activism rather than evidence-based historical inquiry, 
we focus instead on the more substantive questions S&T raise. We 
initially summarize their essential arguments, although some of the 
statements they make are contradictory in nature. We then discuss 
fundamental issues and genuine challenges to accounting history 
posed by the post-Kuhnian critique that S&T and others represent, as 
well as the nature and purpose of historical enquiry. We reviewed the 
accounting history journal articles published between 2001 and 2005 
and use our findings to evaluate the broad assertions that S&T make 
about accounting history. We conclude that S&T’s critique is unwar-
ranted and unjust, especially when the subject matter of the most 
recent accounting history articles is considered.
INTRODUCTION: SY AND TINKER ASSERTIONS
 Sy and Tinker (S&T) contend that Thomas Kuhn’s work on 
the construction of theory in the natural sciences has created 
a seismic historiographic shift that has not been acknowledged 
by accounting historians, whom they characterize as “archival-
ists” because of their unwavering belief that historical data 
Acknowledgments: We want to acknowledge Christopher Napier specifically 
for his helpful comments and suggestions as discussant of our paper at the 2006 
IPA Conference in Cardiff, Wales. We also acknowledge an unnamed reviewer for 
helpful insights on Thomas Kuhn’s writings and the nature of the Kuhn/Popper 
debate.
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are capable of objective verification. According to S&T, Kuhn 
[1970] has proven that empiricism is defunct, notwithstanding 
that the frauds S&T cite as proof of history’s inherent fallibil-
ity were themselves refuted by evidence, and that the historical 
materialism that they promote as an alternative to archivalism 
also requires evidence before one can accept it as an historical 
explanation of social conditioning.
 S&T also allege that the Kuhnian revolution has been suc-
cessful among scientists and non-accounting historians alike, 
and that by basing their conclusions on ineffectual methodolo-
gies (i.e., historical evidence and the principle of falsification), 
accounting historians are in a serious state of denial. S&T 
describe this alleged widespread acceptance of the fallibility of 
empirical research as the “triumph of history over philosophy,” 
although they also criticize accounting historians for not engag-
ing with philosophy in the first place. Furthermore, accounting 
historians continue to address the wrong issues (i.e., the great, 
white, Eurocentric men of the past), and most importantly, do 
not embrace an unequivocal moral stance vis-à-vis their subject 
matter.1 For example, S&T [2005, p. 53] write:
Specifically, we provide a series of examples to remind 
the reader of the vulnerability of Empirical Science to 
ideological partisanship; not only in establishing the 
verity of some ideas, but also in demonstrating the fal-
sity of others. The implication is not merely about dis-
tortions of the truth, but more importantly, the need for 
greater social self-awareness by accounting historians, 
such that they systematically grasp the terrain in con-
flict situations, and make an informed but inescapable 
choice about which side to ally their history. Such an 
[sic] socio-historical episteme is diametrically opposite 
to the philosophically naïve objectivity that under-girds 
much archival research.
 S&T similarly contend that by focusing on the wrong issues, 
accounting historians have ignored the repressed voices and 
social conflicts of the past, the inference being that when they 
have taken sides, they have allied with the wrong party. As a re-
sult, S&T argue, conservative viewpoints dominate the academy, 
and those with a more progressive spirit have been unable or are 
unwilling to use the history of accounting to help liberate the 
world of the present. 
 S&T infer that a belief in the inherent objectivity of fac-
1See Sy and Tinker [2006] for a more detailed discussion of Eurocentricism.
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tual evidence is the cause of accounting history’s misplaced alle-
giances. Although they do not explain why specifically, one must 
presume it is because historical truths for post-Kuhnians are 
always relative to a particular time and place. Following Kuhn, 
this is the time and place where the historian is situated since 
Kuhn is writing about the manner in which the dominant scien-
tific paradigm of the day colors the choice of topic and interpre-
tation of evidence [S&T, 2006]. This would, for instance, help ex-
plain the Eurocentric nature of accounting history as well as its 
male gender bias and what S&T regard as an obsession with the 
great persons of the past and double-entry bookkeeping. Hence, 
S&T [2005, p. 49] argue that “any assertion as to the verity of a 
statement of fact…requires a philosophical warrant.” Any defini-
tive statement about the past is entirely unsustainable because it 
derives from an historian’s epistemic, empirical selection of par-
ticular factoids among a set of competing evidential data. Thus, 
while accounting historians would like to consider themselves 
to be even-handed, they are unable to replicate an objective past 
due to the inherent bias and subjectivity of their search and dis-
covery process. 
 Given this unavoidable bias, S&T contend that accounting 
history would be better served if accounting historians adopt an 
unequivocal moral stance vis-à-vis their particular historical epi-
sode. Thus, they should examine the context and conflict associ-
ated with the episode (S&T’s emphasis on conflict is presumably 
a reflection of the importance of class conflict in Marxist histo-
ry), evaluate the arguments of the combatants, and openly pro-
mote the socially responsible position. According to S&T [2005, 
p. 53], a failure to advocate is not only a missed opportunity for 
accounting history, it has “undermined its authority to address 
pressing problems in accounting practice and theory today.” 
 S&T are equally fervent about the outcome of Kuhn/Popper 
debates concerning the philosophy of history. These debates 
have incorporated the relationship between evidence and reality, 
the inability of competing theorists to communicate with one 
another, and the nature of scientific observation, explanation, 
and prediction. S&T collapse the debates to “the meaning of 
truth,” and extend Popper’s falsification (refutation) theory to 
the work that historians undertake. For example, S&T [2005, p. 
51] write:
Refutation itself was also a flawed project for the his-
torians. Their criticisms focused on the tenuous link 
between Theory and Reality. Ascertaining the meaning 
3
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of empirical observations is always problematic. Obser-
vations are invariably mediated by senses and measur-
ing instruments, and therefore all results are contingent 
ontwo theories –, not one – the primary theory of inter-
est, and a second (measurement) theory about how a 
mediating device operates.
The implication is that we can “never be certain” to have refuted 
a primary theory given that our “observation theory may be 
faulty” [S&T, 2005, p. 52], even though, as Bryer [2006, p. 552] 
has pointed out, such a dichotomy does not accord with Kuhn’s 
[1970, pp. 10-11] own view that “law, theory, application, and 
instrumentation” – “what questions may legitimately be asked…. 
and what techniques employed in seeking solutions” [Kuhn, 
1970, p. 5] – cannot be separated. 
 Thus for S&T, perception trumps reality every time, a 
view which directly links Kuhn’s historical relativism to Marx’s 
 historical materialism. Historical materialism alleges that the 
social existence of men, which is in turn a product of the mate-
rial conditions in which they live, determines their whole con-
sciousness, their ideas, and the way they see the world. Histori-
ans following an historical materialist approach would therefore 
be a) very aware of the social context of the time; b) recognize 
that their own ideas are also social constructions; and c) since 
all ideas are social constructions, accept there is no point in at-
tempting to remain neutral. According to Marwick [2002, p. 4], 
“Marx criticized the philosophers for seeking to understand the 
world, when, he declared, the problem was to ‘change it’.”
 S&T advance historical materialism as a far better modus 
operandi for accounting history than the accounting “archi-
valism” they disparage.2 In essence, S&T call for historians to 
throw away the scale, choose sides, and enter the fray, presum-
ably on the side of the vanquished, impoverished, and socially 
repressed that accounting history has, allegedly, hitherto ig-
nored, rather than to continue their support of white-male, 
Eurocentric propertied interests – the purported subject of 
mainstream accounting history.3 
2Although S&T never specifically define the word “archivalism,” they seem to 
equate it to “empiricism,” a word that signifies the primacy of evidence in validat-
ing or refuting a particular theory.
3S&T [2005, p. 47] speak thusly about mainstream accounting history: “De-
spite the Kuhnian Revolution, archival antiquarianism reigns supreme. This re-
gime survives in a North-Korean-like insularity, by combining a self-referential 
closure using the Great Men of accounting with a refusal to engage a broader 
literature in social history.”
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 Unfortunately, S&T do not provide criteria that would help 
historians (or the subjects of the historical inquiry) make the 
correct choice when the distinctions between good and evil are 
not self-evident nor do they provide specific examples of where 
accounting historians have made the wrong choice. Instead, 
they generally argue that the historian “should align herself with 
the side judged to be morally and socially appropriate” [S&T, 
2005, p. 49]. 
 In the second part of their paper, S&T describe the histori-
cal frauds that were perpetrated by Copernicus and the hoaxers 
who created the Piltdown Man, examples they would surely 
acknowledge are quite far afield from the domain of account-
ing history. S&T describe and then critique these episodes as 
examples which show the limitations of historical evidence. 
Fraud is a poor yardstick for judging whether history is capable 
of objective verification, given that subjectivity in history usually 
arises not through manipulating the evidence but through 
conflicts of interpretation. S&T conclude by calling for account-
ing historians to produce “relevant history” by addressing the 
moral quandaries of the present, such that history “becomes an 
emancipatory exercise, where knowledge of the past becomes 
an instrument of edification and ennoblement; not subjugation” 
[S&T, 2005, p. 63].
 In the balance of our paper, we briefly summarize the Kuhn/
Popper debate and conclude that if the Kuhnian revolution 
“reigns supreme,” there are insurgents outside of accounting ar-
chivalism that continue to contest the outcome. We next identify 
the substantive questions that underlie historical research rather 
than the social advocacy that S&T propound. We then review 
and categorize accounting history journal publications during 
the 2001-2005 period. We conclude with an evidence-based as-
sessment of S&T’s assertions as well as the state of current ac-
counting history research.
THE KUHN/POPPER DEBATE
 While S&T portray the debate between Kuhn and Popper 
as a clear victory for Kuhnian devotees, the outcome appears 
far less decisive. Kuhnian and post-Kuhnian (post-positivist) 
supporters argue that competing paradigms are incommen-
surable and cannot be refuted on the basis of evidence each 
party amasses. This occurs because each paradigm’s supporters 
would present only that evidence which bolsters their particular 
perspective, leaving them incapable of disproving the verity 
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presented by the other side. Consequently, paradigms cannot be 
refuted on the basis of evidence, which to S&T indicates that 1) 
the concept of absolute truth can never be established, and 2) 
that absolute truth cannot therefore exist. Absent the ability to 
establish absolute truth, S&T [2005, p. 49] argue that “partisan-
ship in history is inescapable.” 
 Harris [1992, p. 89] acknowledges that the denial of truth, 
or at least this interpretation of Kuhn’s thinking, “leads di-
rectly to a radical relativism with all of attending difficulties.” 
However, Harris [1992, p. 166] proposes a different solution to 
resolve intellectual debates, one that most archival historians 
would readily embrace: 
If anything is ever to resolve the dispute between com-
peting theories it will be by the accumulation of more 
data through experiments by more researchers over a 
longer period of time.
 Laudan [1996, p. 5] similarly characterizes Kuhn, Feyera-
bend, and other post-positivists as “thoroughgoing relativists” 
who are committed to three overriding principles:
(1) that evidence radically underdetermines theory 
choice – to the extent that virtually any theory can be 
rationally retained in the face of any conceivable evi-
dence (epistemic relativism); (2) that the standards for 
theory evaluation are mere conventions, reflecting no 
facts of the matter (metamethodological relativism); and 
(3) that one conceptual framework or worldview cannot 
be made intelligible in the language of a rival (linguistic 
relativism).
Unlike S&T [2005, pp. 47, 49), who disdain accounting history 
“as soldiering under impoverished Archivalism,” and promote 
“the triumph of Kuhnian and Post-Kuhnian History over Phi-
losophy,” Laudan [1996, p. 5] views post-positivism as: 
…an intellectual failure. The arguments on its behalf 
are dubious and question-begging. Still worse, it has 
sustained virtually no positive program of research...
and that it now teeters on the brink of conceptual 
bankruptcy.
 Marwick [2002, p. 5], the founding professor of history at 
the Open University, is similarly unequivocal in his refutation of 
the impact of Kuhnian principles on both scientific and histori-
cal research:
Working historians, and working scientists, have gen-
6
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erally been too busy to philosophize about their sub-
jects. Au royaume des aveugles les borgnes sont rois...In 
science, a conspicuous example is T.H. Kuhn, whose 
fine-sounding thesis about the succession of culturally 
determined scientific ‘paradigms’ dictating the topics of 
research departs from the facts of scientific discovery. 
Historians and scientists have tended to pay lip-service 
to these ‘kings’ before, usually, ignoring their theories 
and carrying on as before.
 Clearly, there is ongoing debate regarding the influence of 
Kuhnian and post-Kuhnian principles on both scientific and his-
torical research. There is also controversy regarding what Kuhn 
actually meant by the term “incommensurability.” Bird [2000, p. 
264] contends that “the central element in Kuhn’s epistemologi-
cal outlook is his neutralism about truth” rather than a deniabil-
ity of truth, as S&T, Feyerabend, and other post-Kuhnians infer. 
For example, Kuhn [1970, pp. 4-5] did not maintain that the 
incommensurability of competing paradigms in science prevents 
“effective research.” Instead, he regarded the existence of “a set 
of received beliefs” about the natural world as a precondition for 
its progress. In the first place, it is the belief-set that will set the 
agenda about which questions to ask. Second, the unexplained 
anomalies thrown up by these questions will eventually become 
so compelling as to produce a paradigm shift (“revolution” 
in science). Thus, for Kuhn [1970, pp. 52-53], progress in the 
natural sciences is not driven by debates about “the objectives 
and methods of research,” but by revolutionary transformations 
in generally accepted conceptions, which are themselves the 
product of more research [Bryer, 1998, p. 670]. Indeed, one of 
the characteristics of a paradigm is that it should be “sufficiently 
open-ended to leave all sorts of problems” for its adherents to 
resolve, making use of the “rules and standards for scientific 
practice” to which they are “committed” [Kuhn, 1970, pp. 10-
11]. Kuhn was not, therefore, the “thoroughgoing relativist” that 
S&T portray. Instead, he regarded “factual and theoretical novel-
ty” as being “closely...intertwined in scientific discovery” [Kuhn, 
1970, p. 53]. It follows that progress in science is not simply an 
abstraction, a realization which, according to Bryer [1998, p. 
691], offers hope for progress in other disciplines, including ac-
counting history:
Thus, from Kuhn’s point of view, progress in build-
ing a community of historians of accounting depends 
upon recognition of the competing conceptions of the 
subject-matter, and a debate in which anomalies are  
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highlighted and resolved by recourse to imagination, to 
logic, and to the facts.
 In fairness to S&T, we acknowledge that the citations (i.e., 
“evidence”) we have gathered support our point of view; how-
ever, unlike S&T, we believe the Kuhnian “revolution” is indeter-
minate and that neither relativists nor positivists should claim 
victory. We also recognize that it is often courageous and en-
nobling to take a strong moral stance, especially when it refutes 
the position of those holding both the power and the purse. Not-
withstanding, we respect mainstream historians who attempt to 
be dispassionate about their depiction of past events, especially 
when they identify competing interpretations of their evidence. 
For example, one of this article’s authors engaged in a series of 
heated debates regarding the purpose and nature of accounting 
at the Springfield Armory and New England textile mills in the 
early and mid-1800s [Hoskin & Macve, 1988a, b, 1994, 1996; 
2000; Tyson, 1990; 1993; 1995; 1998]. We argued back and forth, 
even though each held different world views and wrote from dif-
ferent “paradigms.” We strongly disagreed on the interpretation 
of the evidence, but that is something which scholarly folks do 
all the time. Thus, while the clashes were intense, at least on an 
intellectual level, we never argued about the inherent inability of 
evidence to bolster our respective positions. 
 To put these debates another way, historians generally ac-
cept that history is subjective to some degree, and that histori-
cal progress (i.e., greater understanding about the past) is best 
achieved through dialogue. In point of fact, post-Kuhnians like 
S&T rarely provide evidence by which a reader can evaluate the 
strength of their truth claims.4 Absent evidence, their persuasive-
ness hinges on the passion of their appeal and the logic of their 
argument, something we tackle head on in the next section of 
the paper. 
THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH
 We believe that there are fundamental differences between 
historical inquiry and social activism. Unlike social activists, 
4Laudan [1996, p. 9] concludes the concept of incommensurability which 
underlies Kuhnian and post-Kuhnian thinking has never been systematically 
evaluated in a way that could lead to the triumph S&T promote: “From the begin-
ning of its vogue in the early 1960s, incommensurability has been a philosophical 
conundrum in search of instantiation. Neither Kuhn nor Feyerabend, its most 
prominent early advocates, presents any evidence that natural scientists on op-
posite sides of a theoretical fence systematically failed to understand one another, 
as the thesis of incommensurability requires.”
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who seek to build a “better” (i.e., more equitable, honorable, 
humane, etc.) world, historians simply want to understand 
what happened in the past, why things happened as they did, 
and perhaps to help explain the present and predict the fu-
ture, given that past events may serve as prologue in certain 
circumstances. To obtain their knowledge, historians examine 
primary documents that were, ideally, created by participants 
in past events (i.e., memoranda, journals, personal letters, or 
other first-hand accounts) and/or, secondarily, by contemporary 
observers of these events (newspaper reports, business records, 
etc.). In either case, documents form the core of an historian’s 
understanding and the basis for interpretations. As Evans [1999, 
p. 69] writes, “what is at issue, therefore, is how historians use 
documents not to establish discrete facts, but as evidence for 
establishing the larger patterns that connect them.”
 Most historians readily concede that while there may be 
consensus that particular events played out in a particular fash-
ion, there is rarely a single interpretation that explains why the 
event occurred or its impact and implications. Again, we fully 
concur with Evans [1999, p. 72] regarding the use and inter-
pretation of historical documents in arriving at our conclusions 
regarding these issues:
Documents can be read in a variety of ways, all of them, 
theoretically at least, equally valid. Moreover, it is obvi-
ous that our way of reading a source derives principally 
from our present-day concerns and from questions that 
present-day theories and ideas lead us to formulate. Nor 
is there anything wrong in this.
 The difficulty we have with S&T and other social activists is 
their unabashed intolerance for conventional historical inquiry. 
This intolerance compels them to reject all efforts that seek a 
greater understanding of the past, for its own sake. For example, 
S&T argue that scholars have an inherent social agenda that 
drives their search for supporting historical evidence. Accord-
ingly, this evidence is necessarily biased and, thus, its only use 
is to buttress socially appropriate agendas. Most practicing 
historians would probably reject this position out-of-hand and 
be inclined to support Ginzburg’s [1991, p. 83] views concerning 
the use and interpretation of evidence:
The historian is thus confronted with various possi-
bilities: a document can be a fake; a document can be 
authentic, but unreliable, insofar as the information it 
provides can be either lies or mistakes; or a document 
9
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can be authentic and reliable. In the first two cases the 
evidence is dismissed; in the latter, it is accepted, but 
only as evidence of something else. In other words, the 
evidence is not regarded as a historical document in it-
self, but as a transparent medium – as an open window 
that gives us direct access to reality.
 As far as accounting history goes, there has been some rec-
ognition in the literature of the challenge to ascribing meanings 
posed by postmodernism, with truth acknowledged as a question 
of interpretation, in turn depending on the language we have at 
our disposal for describing it. The emphasis in postmodernist 
literature on meaning in financial reporting as a reflexive con-
struct of social processes rather than as something containing 
objective reality [Hines, 1988, 1991] is a case in point. Thus, it is 
argued there is no such thing as faithfully representing econom-
ic reality in accounts. What we are in fact representing is the 
accountant’s view of reality which is determined by their prior 
training and beliefs. In this scheme, meaning is constrained by 
language as this is the medium through which meaning is both 
expressed and understood. Hence, the Foucauldian view of his-
tory is that of a series of “discursive formations” [Hopwood, 
1987, p. 230; Armstrong, 1994, pp. 28-29], as Miller and Napier 
[1993, p. 633] discuss:
We emphasize the discursive nature of calculation. We 
attend to all those diverse ways in which meaning and 
significance is attributed to particular ways of calculat-
ing. We are referring here to the language and vocabu-
lary in which a particular practice is articulated, the 
ideals attached to certain calculative technologies, and 
the rationales that set out the aims and aspirations of 
various authorities.
 The emphasis is on discursive formations rather than his-
torical events precisely because meanings are acknowledged as 
contingent on the ways in which knowledge is interpreted and 
communicated. However, the problem we have with this no-
tion is that careful attention to the singularity of such meanings 
does not allow the historian to subsume events into generaliza-
tions, and generalizations into theory. As a result, this aspect of 
Foucauldianism has tended to be rejected as accounting history 
has become more theoretical in recent years. If knowledge can 
only be interpreted in the context of particular situations, it is 
not possible to generalize causal relationships which are the es-
sence of theory construction. 
10
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 To get around this dilemma, Robson [1991], for instance, 
introduces the general concept of “translation” into his history 
of the genesis of accounting standards in the U.K., allowing him 
to sidestep what Armstrong [1994, p. 35] described as the lack of 
“dynamism” in Foucauldianism as a theoretical explanation of 
accounting change. Thus, Robson argues that accounting change 
can be understood as a “process” whereby “particular account-
ing statements, calculations and techniques” are translated into 
“wider social, economic and political discourses,” which in turn 
“suggest new problems and priorities for accounting practices 
and stimulate the process of accounting change” [Robson, 1991, 
p. 566]. Ezzamel and Hoskin [2002, pp. 340-341] do something 
similar while exploring the relationship between accounting, 
writing, and money. They argue that the whole history of money 
can be understood as a general process of “supplementarity,” in 
which successively more complex forms of money are created 
(i.e., coinage, bills of exchange, endorsed discounted notes, etc.) 
that enhance its “operation and power” in society [Ezzamel and 
Hoskin, 2002, p. 361]. 
 There would appear to be a tension in accounting histori-
ography, therefore, over the desire to use history to construct 
theory in a post-modern world that stresses the relativity of 
meanings. Whether theoretical history is tenable is debatable 
given the unpredictability of historical events [Oldroyd, 1999]. 
Nevertheless, theoretical perspectives on accounting history 
have gained ascendancy precisely to avoid the criticism of “anti-
quarianism” leveled at it by S&T. In particular, there has been a 
willingness to engage with other disciplines which is the ration-
ale of the interdisciplinary perspectives on accounting move-
ment [Miller et al., 1991]. And to their credit, most theoretical 
historians recognize the need to ground their theory in archival 
evidence. Bryer is a case in point. Having first spent many years 
developing his theory regarding the transition to capitalism, he 
is now seeking to validate it through archival research [Bryer, 
2005, 2006a, b; Bryer et al., 2005]. 
 Indeed, to accept S&T’s view that the past is essentially 
unknowable in any objective sense, and that it is not therefore 
worth trying to be objective, robs history of its intellectual im-
perative of trying to uncover and explain past events, and entails 
disengaging from the discipline. This can be illustrated by the 
debate over the existence of an ancient matriarchy. Here, ma-
triarchal study groups outside mainstream academic research 
have alienated themselves from academic prehistorians, includ-
ing most feminists, through their rejection of the historical 
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 processes of gathering and evaluating evidence. Instead, they 
follow the type of social advocacy promoted by S&T in discover-
ing an anti-evidentially based past in which empathy and con-
nectedness with their female ancestors assumes priority. The 
point becomes to show modern women how much they are re-
pressed, that this was not always the case, and that a better way 
is therefore possible. But it ceases to be history [Oldroyd, 2004]. 
 Finally, as scholars who are more concerned with account-
ing history than with the theory of history, we believe that 
knowledge about the past, accounting or otherwise, must be 
based on both dialogue and knowledge. Furthermore, we believe 
that the growth in knowledge derives from new evidence or 
the reinterpretation of existing evidence that often comes from 
historical inquiry as well as social advocacy and other forms 
of intellectual activity. S&T unequivocally disparaged current 
accounting history research in their recent article. The next sec-
tion of this paper reviews several dimensions of their inquiry to 
see if S&T’s claims hold up.
 
REVIEW OF RECENT ACCOUNTING  
HISTORY JOURNAL ARTICLES
 We decided to review the main articles that appeared in 
three peer-reviewed journals that specialize in accounting his-
tory – Accounting Historians Journal (AHJ), Accounting History 
(AH), and Accounting, Business & Financial History (ABFH).5 We 
limited our examination to the five-year period 2001-2005 and 
acknowledge that earlier or longer periods could provide differ-
ent results. We included “Interface” articles in AHJ and special 
issue articles that appeared in all three journals. We excluded 
ABFH articles that focus on banking, insurance, valuation, and 
other aspects of business history that are, in our view, only tan-
gentially related to accounting history. We also excluded articles 
that are described as comments, responses, editorials, book 
reviews, conference reports, or commissioned works. As a result 
of these filters, we reviewed the abstracts of 176 articles that 
were published in the five-year period of study and categorized 
them according to five criteria – topic area(s), methodology, time 
focus, geographic focus, and eclecticism.
 Clearly, the most difficult and subjective aspect of our rubric 
5We recognize that other journals publish articles on accounting history 
(AAAJ, Abacus, ABR, etc.), but these journals do not specialize in accounting his-
tory. Omitting these journals enabled us to distinguish accounting history articles 
more easily from other accounting-related or business history articles.
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has been to identify the primary topic area and methodology 
of an article. To do so, one author initially and independently 
established a possible breakdown of topic areas. The final 
breakdown was then revised through dialogue with the other 
author. Where we could not agree on a primary classification, 
we chose to place the article in a second or even third category 
area as needed.6 We had far less difficulty in determining an 
article’s primary time and geographic focus, although creating 
time boundaries between periods was problematic. For these 
two categories, one of the authors reviewed each abstract, made 
the assignment, and consulted with the other author to resolve 
uncertainties. 
 The last category, eclecticism, is included in order to il-
lustrate the gender and affiliation of the authors of current ac-
counting history publications, as well as to determine if these 
authors have in fact “avoided engaging this wider literature and 
maintained...a revivalist preoccupation with ‘The Great Men’ 
of accounting” [S&T, 2005, p. 49]. The ratio of non-accounting 
citations to total citations for each article serves as a surrogate 
measure of the extent to which accounting historians engage in 
the wider literature.7 Each article was assigned to one of four 
categories in terms of its citations to non-accounting sources – 
greater than 75%, 50 to 75%, 25-50%, and less than 25%. Finally, 
we computed the percentage of articles authored or co-authored 
by females and those written by scholars with non-U.S. affilia-
tions as measures of eclecticism or diversity.8 
STRAW MEN AND OLD SAWS
 In this section, we use the evidence derived from our review 
of the literature to identify the straw men and old saws that S&T 
6We acknowledge that our classification scheme is artificial and arbitrary. 
That said, our purpose was to organize the journal literature in a way that helped 
us evaluate S&T’s claims and generalizations about accounting history literature. 
7A citation was considered an “accounting” citation if it included the words 
“accounting,” “account,” “financial,” or “tax” in the title of the citation or publica-
tion, or if the journal or book was clearly an accounting journal (i.e., Abacus). In 
addition, if the author of the citation was known to be an accounting academic, 
the citation was treated as accounting even if it did not include any of the key 
words noted above. Finally, the total number of articles was reduced to 166 for 
this part of the study because the authors could not clearly determine if the cita-
tion was accounting or non-accounting because of language in four articles. Our 
intent is to err was on the side of conservatism (i.e., not to overstate the percent-
age of non-accounting citations).
8We contacted each journal’s editor to clarify our uncertainties in determin-
ing an author’s gender, given our unfamiliarity with non-Western first names. 
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conjure up in their assault on accounting history. Our intent 
is not simply to refute S&T’s contentions but rather to paint a 
more accurate picture of the domain of current accounting his-
tory research. We discern a pattern of faulty reasoning in the 
majority of S&T’s claims, many of which include at least one ir-
relevant premise as a basis for presenting an opposing position. 
According to Damer [1987, p. 128]:
This fallacy consists in misrepresenting an opponent’s 
point of view or argument, usually for the purpose of 
making it easier to attack. There are several different 
ways in which one may misrepresent an opponent’s 
argument or position. First, one may state it in a per-
verted form by utilizing only a part of it, by paraphras-
ing it in carefully chosen misleading words, or by subtly 
including one’s own evaluation or commentary in it. 
Second, one may oversimplify it…Third, one may ex-
tend the argument beyond its original bounds by draw-
ing inferences from it that are clearly unwarranted or 
unintended.
 We illustrate below instances where S&T present false 
or, more generously, naïve premises in the manner Damer de-
scribes. We initially replicate S&T’s comments and then briefly 
describe the fallacy and our findings in bold italics. We base our 
responses, in part, on our analysis of accounting history journal 
articles during the 2001-2005 period. We present our conclu-
sions and welcome S&T’s rejoinder if we have misrepresented, 
misinterpreted, or otherwise inaccurately captured their senti-
ments. 
1. “Despite the Kuhnian Revolution, archival antiquarianism 
reigns supreme....Accounting history’s resolute adherence to 
empiricist, archival, and otherwise antiquarian epistemes...” 
[S&T, 2005, pp. 47, 49].
 While accounting historians continue to prioritize archi-
val-based studies, as do most historians, a number of re-
cent articles can be assigned to a number of more modern 
and critical categories, including race, culture, and theo-
rizing. In our view, the range of topics and methodologies 
challenges S&T’s conclusion that “antiquarianism reigns 
supreme.”
2. “This paper redresses the balance in two ways: First, by us-
ing Kuhn’s critique to show archivalist empiricism as inca-
pable of proving a paradigm’s truth...” [S&T, 2005, p. 47].
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 We read and reread S&T’s article and are unconvinced 
that it and Kuhn’s critique clearly demonstrate that “ar-
chivalist empiricism is incapable of proving a paradigm’s 
truth.” Most accounting historians accept the subjectiv-
ity of historical truth, but this does not mean that truth 
does not exist or that it is not worth looking for. After all, 
events do happen (unless we are dreaming) and for a rea-
son, even if it is an accident.
3.  “Accounting history has avoided engaging in this wider liter-
ature and maintained a methodological naivety, by excessive 
internal self-referencing, an over-dependence on influential 
editorial oracles, and a revivalist preoccupation with ‘The 
Great Men’ of accounting” [S&T, 2005, p. 49].
 We discovered that only 13 articles out of the 176 ar-
ticles reviewed are biographical, and only three of these 
appeared in the last two years of the period – hardly “a 
revivalist preoccupation with ‘The Great Men’ of ac-
counting.” Indeed, articles on Pacioli and Littleton, the 
two “great men” identified by S&T are notable by their 
absence. We also found that over 40% of the articles have 
more than 50% of their citations from non-accounting 
sources. In our view, the data indicate that many ac-
counting historians are actively engaging in the “wider 
literature.”
4. “…progressive forms of accounting history have taken a 
back seat to conservative renditions on the subject” [S&T, 
2005, p. 49].
 Our review of the 2001-2005 accounting history literature 
revealed a wide range of primary topic areas including 
race and gender. In addition, over 30% of the 176 articles 
included one or more female authors and nearly 70% in-
cluded one or more non-U.S.- based authors. These data 
suggest that recent accounting history articles published 
during the 2001-2005 period are not “conservative” in 
that they neither focus exclusively on Eurocentric topics 
nor are they written exclusively by white, Anglo/Eurocen-
tric, male authors.
5.  “We conclude that the triumph of Kuhnian and Post-
 Kuhnian History over Philosophy is a success that has been 
celebrated everywhere in history except in accounting” 
[S&T, 2005, p. 49].
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 As we argued in the earlier narrative, the “triumph” is 
clearly not celebrated as widely as S&T would suggest.
6.  “It is arrogant and self-serving to claim that accounting his-
tory is exempt from philosophical scrutiny and pretensions” 
[S&T, 2005, p. 49].
 None of the 176 accounting history article abstracts we 
reviewed appeared “arrogant and self-serving,” and we 
challenge S&T to identify one article that makes this 
claim explicitly.
7. “Nor can archivalism get off the hook by claiming it is pre-
philosophical…” [S&T, 2005, p. 50].
 We again challenge S&T to identify any one of the 176 ac-
counting history articles that make this claim about its 
subject matter.
8. “…while some histories purport to be sensitive to context 
and times, such sensitivity is frequently skin-deep” [S&T, 
2005, p. 50].
 The wide range of articles and the extensive use of non-
accounting source materials suggests that accounting 
history authors are paying a great deal of attention to 
context and times.
9. “This is a missed opportunity of tragic proportions for ac-
counting historical research because it has undermined its 
authority to address pressing problems in accounting prac-
tice and theory today” [S&T, 2005, pp. 52-53].
 We do not believe accounting historians have the au-
thority or are they well situated “to address problems in 
practice and theory today.” That undertaking is better left 
to social activists, contemporary critics, and accounting 
regulators. Rather, historians should continue to exam-
ine, illuminate, and interpret the past. 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS
 In general, most historians accept that history is subjective 
to some degree, and that historical progress (i.e., greater un-
derstanding about the past) is best achieved through dialogue. 
Therefore, each historical study constitutes but one cell of the 
wider organism that is always growing and developing. This is 
one reason for the frequently observed phenomenon of each 
16
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 34 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss1/10
189Tyson and Oldroyd: Response to Sy & Tinker
generation rewriting its own history. It is not just new historians 
reinterpreting the past because their own social conditioning 
is different to that of their predecessors. It is because history is 
essentially about discussion fueled by the examination of new 
evidence, which in turn prompts re-examination of the old. 
Sometimes the evidence makes us change our minds. Indeed, 
this concept of progress in history through the interrogation and 
re-interrogation of evidence is not so far removed from Kuhn’s 
[1970, pp. 52-53] ideas regarding progress in science. As we have 
seen, Kuhn maintained that discoveries in science occur when 
the anomalies uncovered by research under a particular para-
digm become so great that they induce paradigm change. The 
main difference in the models, therefore, lies in the pattern of 
change. With Kuhn, these shifts in science occur in steps rather 
than continuously. Most historians, however, are inherently 
aware of the contingent nature of their investigations. Thus, we 
agree with Evans [1999, p. 90] regarding how post-modern and 
other critics of history have made the use of evidence so prob-
lematic:
It did not take the advent of postmodernism to point 
this out. But what postmodernists have done is to push 
such familiar arguments about the transparency or 
opacity of historical texts and sources out to a set of bi-
nary opposites and polarized extremes. Historians have 
always understood that they must scrutinize documents 
and evidence carefully. The language of historical docu-
ments is never transparent, and historians have always 
been aware that they cannot simply gaze through it to 
the historical reality behind. Historians know, histori-
ans have always known, that we can see the past only 
‘through a glass, darkly.’
 Probably the prime example of constructive dialogue in 
accounting history concerns the role of cost and management 
accounting in the British industrial revolution. Historians have 
moved (and are moving) through different stages where initially 
people like Solomons [1952], basing their history on manage-
ment accounting textbooks, saw useful management accounting 
as originating in the U.S. in the later 19th century, to one where 
the likes of Fleischman and Parker [1991, 1992; see also, Fleisch-
man and Tyson, 1993] and Boyns and Edwards [1996 n.b., 1997; 
see also, Edwards, 1989; Edwards and Newell, 1991], who look 
at the records themselves, have successfully championed the 
utility of earlier British industrial accounts to the extent that 
previous opponents, such as Hoskin and Macve [2000], now 
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accept as useful to entrepreneurs, notwithstanding their defi-
ciencies in terms of labor control. And so the debate continues, 
but without evidence the discussions would become stifled and 
essentially rhetorical.
 In terms of the triumph of the Kuhnian revolution, which 
S&T promote so passionately, we wonder whether Kuhn really 
has much to say about history at all. Kuhn’s arguments were di-
rected to the natural sciences, and his debates with Popper cen-
tered on experimental data. For example, Marwick [2002, p. 11] 
identifies several fundamental differences between history and 
the natural sciences which bring into question the applicability 
of S&T’s assertions about accounting history:
Another aspect about the autonomy of history is the dif-
ferences which undoubtedly exist between history and 
the natural sciences. The relationships studied by his-
torians are not basically mathematical in the way that 
those in the sciences are. Obviously, the subject mat-
ter studied is very different; history inevitably involves 
questions of human values, human emotions, human 
motivations. Historians do not conduct experiments. 
Scientists work within a framework of theories, which 
are taken as valid until positively disproved.
 Thus, it appears to us that Kuhn’s followers like Feyerabend 
[1975] and S&T, rather than Kuhn himself, have sought to 
extend Kuhn’s arguments to history and other social sciences. 
There are many pertinent and contentious issues concerning 
the practice of history that surround the nature of evidence, 
but placing the writings of Kuhn at the center of these discus-
sions appears unwarranted. While social activists like S&T may 
continue to prioritize the conflict between relativism and ob-
jectivity, historians have moved on and recognize that the most 
interesting historical questions center on the interpretation of 
past events, not on the evidence which attests to the existence of 
these events. 
 Although we strongly disagree with S&T’s comments about 
accounting history per se, we acknowledge that the vast major-
ity of articles published during the 2001-2005 period within the 
three specialist, English language, accounting history journals 
were written by scholars from the western tradition (U.S., 
U.K., Australasia, and Europe) and address issues in the post-
 Victorian period (1830-present). Thus, S&T are on firmer ground 
when they focus their critique on accounting history’s preoccu-
pation with Eurocentric issues, which they have done in a more 
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recent article [S&T, 2006], notwithstanding the long-standing 
Japanese tradition in this area. However, part of the problem 
here is one of communication rather than of the work not being 
carried out, with studies being published in different languages, 
and by historians outside the accounting academy. Language 
has been a problem for European scholars, as well as non-
 Europeans [Carmona, 2004], and journal editors have responded 
with special issues dedicated to particular geographic locations. 
The intercontinental World Congresses of Accounting Historians 
and the Accounting History International Conferences have also 
been significant in breaking down communication barriers, wid-
ening the field of accounting history research. In actual fact, the 
subject matter of the three English language journals dedicated 
to accounting history appears to be quite broad with significant 
space devoted to non-western topics, often through the vehicle 
of special issues. In conclusion, our review and analysis of the 
2001-2005 accounting history journal literature reveals a vi-
tal, active sub-discipline, one that is capable of change with a 
healthy eclecticism of topic, method, time, and place.
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